Persian Gulf region,
particularly the smaller Persian Gulf states, would face a major threat to
their national security, economic viability and longevity as states. Given the
presence of Russian personnel at the site, an attack on the plant would also
mean risking a confrontation with Russia.
The reason most
experts consider a strike on Bushehr as highly unlikely is that the plant’s
primary function is to generate electricity.
Iran claims it has
an agreement with Russia to collect and reprocess spent fuel from the facility,
which some experts have said makes Bushehr less of a proliferation threat.
What makes it a
potential target is the possibility that Iran would renege and fuel from the
plant could be diverted for the separation of plutonium from irradiated fuel.
This process is slow and requires several years or much more frequent refuelling
cycles which can be easily detected by the Russians and the IAEA. The timeline
for Iran producing a plutonium weapon has been placed at no earlier than 2015
and perhaps beyond. This May, the plant was reported to be operating at 75%
capacity and was expected to reach full capacity soon thereafter.
133 Ariel Zurulnick,
“Iran nuclear program: 5 key sites,” Christian Science Monitor,
“Iran’s Bushehr nuke
power plant nears full capacity,” Xinhua, 4 May 2012,
History
of the Site
Bushehr is not an
ordinary nuclear power plant. It is a nuclear experiment. Originally, Iran and
Germany planned a joint venture to build two pressurized water reactors subcontracted
to ThyssenKruppAG based on the design of the German Biblis Nuclear Power Plant.
The construction of the first reactor at Bushehr that began in 1971 was scheduled
for completion in 1980 and the second, in 1981. It was abandoned after the revolution
of 1979 and damaged during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. For much of those
years, the plant was frozen in time, subjected to an embargo that left Iran
with no access to German expertise and documentation concerning over 80,000 random
pieces of equipment and spare parts, many of which were exposed to a hot and
humid climate.
The challenge of
salvaging Iran’s white elephant on the Persian Gulf fell upon the Russians, at
a cost to the Iranian citizens of 10 billion dollars. In 1995, Iran signed a
contract with Russia’s Ministry for
Atomic Energy to
revive the plant by installing the V-320 915 MW(e)
VVER 1000
pressurized water reactor. The project was scheduled for completion in 2001,
and then in September 2007. Finally, on August 21, 2010, at a ceremony with his
Iranian counterparts, the chief of
Russia’s Rosatom
state agency, former Soviet Prime Minister Sergei
Kirienko, marked the
official opening of the Bushehr nuclear plant with the transfer of enriched
uranium from a fuel rod to the plant.
In February 2011,
Russia was forced to shut down the plant to “thoroughly clean the reactor core
and the primary cooling system to remove metal shards left by the cooling pump
failure.” The failure was blamed on German cooling pumps dating back to the
1970s.
Russia’s Ambassador
to Iran stated that the delay was necessary since it is better “to prevent
unwanted consequences rather than to regret it later,” which Iranian state
radio confirmed.
In a joint press
conference held on February 26, 2009, Reza Aghazadeh, then head of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, blamed Nuclear Gamble The Last Straw.
V. CASE STUDIES
The delays on the
design anomalies at Bushehr: “24% of the parts and equipment used at the
Bushehr power plant are German, 36% Iranian, and 40% Russian.”135 Kirienko
agreed. As he put it, “Until now, no one has succeeded in operationalizing such
a plant, and, actually completing the Bushehr nuclear plant is not the same as
constructing a new plant but rather it is completing a plant that has been
constructed by a company from another company and consequently, we have had to
make extremely important technical decisions about it.”136 When pressed to
explain a decade of delays, Kirienko could not resist a dig at his Iranian
counterparts: “Of course, it is 35 years past the deadline. “In a report
released by the IAEA in November 2011, the agency reported that the reactor at
Bushehr is operational; however, information regarding its electrical
production was unavailable. Finally, in
May 2012, Rosatom
announced that it had conducted a test on May
1, and that the
power plant had successfully generated electricity at
90% of its
capacity.137 The head of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI)
Fereidoun Abbasi, anounced that the plant had
produced 730 MW of
electricity since February and the Mohammad
Hossein Jahanbakhsh,
Governor-General of the province declared
that “the Russian
contractor will definitely deliver the power plant
to the Iranian side
by the end of autumn [2012].”138
Human Casualty
Estimates
Most immediate
casualties would occur among the Bushehr plant
workers and people
close by. We estimate the total number of workers
at the site at
between 2,000-3,000 people, plus their families. The
number of Russian
advisors at the site was estimated at 1,500139 with
another 500 Iranian
personnel.140 Additional casualties will occur
in the two villages
of Bandargah and Helileh, which are next to the
site and have a
combined population of 4,500 inhabitants in 1,100
households.141 In
recent years, the government has tried to relocate the
people of Bandargah
and Helileh, but faced considerable resistance.142
135 “ASR-Iran News
Analysis,” <http://www.asriran.com/fa/pages/?cid=66101>
(Persian).
136 Ibid.
137 “Russian
Contractor: Bushehr N. Power Plant to Reach Full Capacity in
May,” Fars News
Agency, 4 May 2012, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.
php?nn=9102110533>.
138 Ibid.
139 “Moscow: The
number of workers at Bushehr facilities will double,”
Islamic Republic
News Agency, <http://www2.irna.com/ar/news/view/line-
8/8611269045074856.htm>
(Persian).
140 John C.K. Daly,
“Iranian Bushehre Nuclear Plant Comes Online,” Stock Market
Review,
<http://www.stockmarketsreview.com/extras/iranian_bushehr_nuclear_
plant_comes_online_world_survives_20110916_162652/>.
141 Bushehr
geographical and census information available at
<http:www.nasirboushehr.com/Journal-0l-issue140-3964.html>(Persian). This
newspaper and its
website were created
by the Iranian government in late 2011.
142 Note:
Ahmadinejad announced in his last visit to Bushehr Province that the
people of these two
places should be relocated as part of the Bushehr Nuclear
Power Plant
development plan. Subsequently, the Bushehr governor banned the
movement of certain
construction material to Bandargah and Helileh. This subject
was approved in a
visit of the Iran government headed by Ahmadinejad to Bushehr
province in 2006 and
mentioned on president.ir website (<http:www.president.ir/
fa/?ArtlD=8151>).
The head of Iran Atomic Energy Organization announced in an
interview that this
is part of Bushehr power plant development plan and was also
approved in National
Security Council.
To complicate
matters, the location of the plant next to the sea limits
site access to one
road.
Beyond the immediate
casualties, several factors make Bushehr
particularly
dangerous. The site is 10 km (6.2 miles) south-east
of Bushehr, a city
with a population of more than 240,000 people
(Figure 37). The
prevailing winds in the area blow predominantly to
the North-West in
the direction of the city of Bushehr (Table 7). An
attack on the
facility would result in the release of large quantities of
fission products
including iodine-131, strontium-90, and cesium-137
which, due to their
heavy concentration, could easily engulf the city.
Recognizing that
radioactive material outside the plant operating area
is less likely to
have acute health consequences, even if only 1-5% of the
population is
exposed to significant radiation levels, 2,400 to 12,000
people could suffer
from chronic effects such as those witnessed in
the aftermath of
Chernobyl. Given the proximity of Bandarghah and
Helileh, the
casualty rates from the effect of bombing and exposure
to radiation can
exceed 50%. Further, as with Pripyat, the Russian
city evacuated after
Chernobyl, Bushehr would become uninhabitable
for many decades
into the future.
Figure 37: Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant distant. Distance to Bushehr
City 10 miles (Map
source: Wikimapia, TerraMetrics)
Station Name
Yearly
Average
Wind
Direction
Max.
Wind
Speed
(mi/h)
Bushehr Synoptic
Station N 34
Jam Synoptic Station
SW 31
Borazjan Synoptic
Station W 29
Khark Island
Synoptic Station N 38
Chahkootah Synoptic
Station NW 27
Asalooyeh Synoptic
Station NW-SW 34
Nuclear Gamble The
Last Straw.indd 38 8/10/12 11:23 AM
Table 7: Wind speed
and direction in the vicinity of the Bushehr Nuclear
Power Plant (Source:
I.R. of Iran Meteorological Organization)39
THE AYATOLLAH’S
NUCLEAR GAMBLE
Although they did
not focus on Bushehr as a likely target, in “A
Study on a Possible
Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development
Facilities” published
by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in
March 2009, Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah
Toukan predicted the
highest level of environmental damage would
come from an attack
on the Bushehr Nuclear Plant.143They estimate
the damage from an
attack on an operational nuclear facility can
cause casualties in
the hundreds of thousands. Drawing on Bennett
Ramberg’s
“Destruction of Nuclear Facilities in War,” they point out
that the release of
highly radioactive actinide and uranium fuel fission
products resulting
from the fission process would lead to the release
of iodine-131,
strontium-90, cesium-137, and activation production
material,
plutonium-239, all of which are “most damaging to human
health” since they
attack critical organs such as the lungs, thyroid,
bones, tissues,
organs, and cells.144 In fact, according to this study,
more than 300
radioisotopes can be released into the environment,
over 40 of which are
produced in abundance and have a significant
half-life. These
radioactive particles can contaminate the body through
clothing and skin,
or through wounds. They can be inhaled as dust,
or ingested through
food and water. Once released, it is very hard to
contain their damage
as they can have a “physical half-life ranging
from eight days to
24,400 years, and a biological half-life ranging
from 138 to 500
days.”145
As the CSIS study
warns, “Any strike on the Bushehr Nuclear
Reactor will cause
the immediate death of thousands of people living
in or adjacent to
the site, and thousands of subsequent cancer deaths
or even up to
hundreds of thousands depending on the population
density along the
contamination plume.”146
The major Iranian
city closest to the site after Bushehr is Shiraz
(pop. 1,500,000) to
the northeast of the power plant. However, the
prevailing winds
could carry this radioactive material in the opposite direction across the
Persian Gulf to contaminate Iraq, Kuwait,
Bahrain and other
countries along the southern coast (Figure 36).
Virtually all
population centers in the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates would be at risk. As
noted earlier, a
2007 study published by the U.S. Army War College
warned that attacks
on Bushehr would likely result in catastrophic
regional
environmental consequences, including the contamination of
the majority of the
water desalination plants in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and the United Arab
Emirates, which account for more than half of
the world’s water
desalination capacity.147
143 Anthony
Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike
on Iran’s Nuclear
Development Facilities,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies Report, 14
March 2009,
<http://csis.org/publication/study-possible-israeli-strike-irans-nuclear-development-facilities>.
144 Bennett Ramberg,
“Destruction of Nuclear Facilities in War,” Lexington Books:
3, as quoted in
Toukan,et al., “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear
Development Facilities,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14
March 2009.
146 Anthony
Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike
on Iran’s Nuclear
Development Facilities,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies Report, 14
March 2009,
<http://csis.org/publication/study-possible-israeli-strike-irans-nuclear-development-facilities>.
Figure 38: Direction
of prevailing wind in the vicinity of the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant
(Map source: Wikimapia, TerraMetrics)
Civil Defense
Capabilities
A military strike on
the Bushehr nuclear facility would trigger a
catastrophe on a
scale that would overwhelm the civil defense capabilities of the most advanced
industrial countries, let alone the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Iran simply lacks the civil defense capabilities and
emergency response
plans to respond to a tragedy similar to Chernobyl
or Fukushima. The
Bushehr Province Crisis Management Council
(BPCNC) is
responsible for all emergency responses at the provincial
level. In the event
of major disasters, Fars Province would be called on
for support.148
Still, the total emergency response budget of Bushehr province is less than $10
million, excluding the drought response budget.149As formedical facilities,
there are four hospitals in Bushehr with 520 total beds:150 Fatemeh Zahra, Amir
al Momenin Hospital,
Hospital of Airforce,
and Salman e Farsi, the general hospital of the Welfare Organization. None can
cope with radiation-related injuries.
Environmental and
Economic Consequences
The destruction of
the nuclear facility can lead to the contamination of the Persian Gulf and the
Gulf of Oman water basin, which covers onefourth of the country but accounts
for nearly half of its renewable water resources. Approximately 97,000 wells,
4,000 channels, and 13,500 springs discharge 26.39 km3 (16.38 miles) per year
of groundwater in this major sub-basin.151 Though not a major industrial hub,
this
148 Note: Mohammad
Hussein Jahanbakhsh, Bushehr province governor is head of
BPCNC. He is an
experienced manager, but never had experience before his appointment last
January with Busheshr Province. He was governor of North Khorasan Province in
the past. The same problem exists in other main administrative and response
organizations. High turnover of managers, poor performance and lack of budget
and resources have made its response system inefficient and incapable.
V. CASE STUDIES
province is one of
the main producers of dates and oranges in Iran, as well as limited beef and
lamb production.152 Fisheries also have an important role in the economy, with
production of 50,000 tons (56,000
U.S. tons) of fish
and shrimp in Bushehr province annually.153 Given the province’s heavy reliance
on agriculture, husbandry, and fisheries, the contamination of water and soil
can have a profound impact on the food supply, local economy, and health of the
local population.
Bushehr is also one
of Iran’s main ports, its capacity about 5 million tons (5.6 million U.S. tons)
with offloading/loading non-oil products of 200,000 tons (224,000 U.S. tons)
per month and offloading/loading oil products about 130,000 tons (145,600 US
tons) each month.154
Ship, vessel, and
marine industrial factories, weaving, pottery, gas, petrochemical, and oil are
also other main industrial activities of the province. The destruction of the
Bushehr facility and contamination of the port facility would be a serious
setback to domestic industries and foreign exports.
The Bushehr facility
also strengthens local markets. Destroying the plant would result in the loss
of a multibillion-dollar facility and expensive cleanup and reclamation of
radioactive-contaminated soils and water.
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