International Treaty issues

Written By A.M.313

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPN ) in 1968, ratified it in 1970 and subsequently signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 but has not yet ratified it. In co-operating with Egypt, Iran introduced a proposal for a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-

Free-Zone ( MENWFZ ) in the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, which has since then adopted an annual resolution supporting the goal of such zone. Since 1980 the resolution has been supported by all the states of the region and to this day it continues to be adopted annually by consensus.

Military or not ...

A significant international dispute has emerged over Iran's nuclear programme. Iran insists that its nuclear endeavour are intended only to guarantee an independent nuclear energy capacity and further argues that there is no substantive evidence of a nuclear weapons programme; it stoutly denies that its nuclear programme is directed towards the acquisition of fissile materials. Despite these assurance however, the IAEA remains concerned about the scale and persistence of Iran' s nuclear venture.

There have been problems with transparency of Iran's nuclear programme. Since 2002 Iran has itself revealed a number of previously unknown facilities and activities to the IAEA. And a number of these, including the development of the facility at Natanz and attempts to purchase nuclear materials and equipment, have lead to doubts about the past purpose of Iran' nuclear programme.

Fears are now that with sanctions and continued threats of military action that the Iranian nuclear programme will be driven back underground and international inspections by the IAEA will be halted.

However whether or not Iran intends to develop a weapons programme, this dispute highlights the essential problem with any nuclear programme. The pathway to a bomb is the same as the pathway to nuclear energy; there is no such thing as a proliferation resistant nuclear programme. And this is the same for any nuclear programme anywhere in the world.

Should a current or future government decide it wanted to do so, it's easy. The only way to actually achieve a world free of nuclear weapons is to achieve a world free of all nuclear technology.

Known nuclear facilities in Iran

A) Tehran Nuclear Research Centre

B) kelaye Electric Company - Tehran

C) Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre

D) Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

E) Natanz

F) Karaj Nuclear Research Centre

G) Lashkarabad

H) Arak

I) Anarak

J) Gachin

K) Saghand

L) Farayand Technique

M) Pars Trash

Other sites:

N) Kolahdouz Industrial Complex In Tehran

O) Lavizan-Shian Physics Research Centre

P) Parchin Military Complex

Q) Ardkan

Main nuclear facilities in Iran

Potential Hazards of Iranian Nuclear

Facilities

As with all nuclear programmes around the world, there are a range of environmental and human health risks associated with Iran's nuclear facilities.

As the development of Iran's nuclear programme matures and facilities have been completed/commissioned, risk of incident grows. In addition, there is serious concern about the likelihood of a military strike to 'take out' Iran's nuclear programme. Attention must also be given to the potential impact of sanctions on the ability of Iran to source the best technology, safety equipment etc to manage its nuclear programme. Further, Iran is an area of seismic risk, with the likelihood of earthquakes in the region creating additional risks for its nuclear programme.

Hazard 1)

Tehran Nuclear Research Centre

The TNRC is located in a resident part of Tehran, approximately 5 km north of the centre.

The Centre includes the Tehran Nuclear research reactor, a radioisotope production facility and a radioactive waste handling facility.

The dominant known hazard on the site comes from the research reactor core, and the older used nuclear reactor core also stored on the site.

As a major nuclear research facility in Iran one of the their main centres of nuclear expertise it might be considered a politically worthy target for any military strike. Iran has already officially expressed its concern to the IAEA about the threat of armed attack on its nuclear programme.

Being a relatively low-energy reactor, an accident involving an explosion of sufficient force to release fission product particles into the air is unlikely. However, a release of some of the radioisotope being produce in the reactor could occur, in which case sheltering and even evacuation from an area several kilometres from the plant would be necessary.

In the case if military attack, the severity of damage could be extreme, with severe results for the near- by residential areas, definitely requiring countermeasure such as potassium iodate tablet provision, sheltering and evacuation. The scale of such countermeasures would depend on the exact conditions on the day of the accident but given the location of

TNRC it is likely to have a significant impact on the population of Tehran.

Hazard 2)

Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre

The Nuclear Technology Research Centre in Isfahan is Iran's largest nuclear research centre, and is said to employ as many as 3000 scientists. 41 kilometres south of Tehran this world famous city of approx 1.5 million people is one of the most significant tourist’s attractions in Iran. It is also home for four research reactors, the fuel manufacturing plant that will fabricate fuel assemblies for the reactors in Arak and Bushehr and the Uranium Conversion Facility, creating UF6 for the enrichment at Natanz.

The dominant radiological hazards on the site are the small research reactor cores. A greater risk comes from the uranium ore and UF6 gas used and produced at the facility.

Recent reports from Iran indicate that 250 tonnes of UF6 gas is being stored in tunnels below the facility.

The chances of a military strike is high. Accidents have occurred in enrichment facilities around the world. For example in 1986 an accident occurred at the Sequoyah Fuels enrichment facility in Oklahama USA. One worker died and 42 other workers and 100 nearby residents were hospitalised with evidence of kind eh damage from uranium exposure. The site was eventually closed in 1992 as a result of contamination to soil and groundwater.

Greater concern about this plant is an accident and or military strike releasing UF6 into the atmosphere. Upon contact with air, UF6 breaks down to form uranyl fluorida and hydrogen fluoride, the latter is a highly corrosive chemical, which cam hazardous if inhaled in sufficient quantities or cause severe burns on contact with the skin. An explosion resulting in the dispersal of the uranium stored on the site, would also be highly toxic to populations around the facilities causing damage to internal organs, particularly the kidneys as well as increasing the risk of cancer and other genetic defects in affected populations.

Hazard 3)

Bushehr Nuclear Reactor

The Busher Nuclear reactor is only 12 km from Bushehr which has a population of 165000.

Bushehr is the largest single source of radioactivity in the region. A considerable risk is presented by the spent fuel pool. Reactor accident can be the tigger for fuel pool accidents and vice versa, leading to increased radioactive release. The spent fuels return to the Russian Federation in batches after about 5 years of post core cooling. If the return of the spent fuels is delayed, for example for up to fifteen years, the radioactive hazard from the fuel accumulating in the storage pond will exceed that of the active fuel core of the reactor.

The reactors being built at Bushehr have a high energy output, operating at a higher temperature and pressure, accelerating corrosion of components. Failure in the steam generators is. A notorious weak point, which can lead to radioactive release outside the containment and in worst cases to severe accidents. Similarly cracks appear frequently in the cap on the reactor vessel. And, as the system involves hydrogen production, hydrogen explosions can occur in the course of an accident if the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel is compromised( like what happened in Chernobyl in 1986 ), considerably increasing the severity of the acciden. Furthermore in two unit plants, an accident in one reactor can affect the safety of the other.

This type of reactor also depends more heavily than other types on a complicated safety system, reliant upon a continuous electricity supply. Emergency systems, and particularly back up power supplies must be exceptionally reliable especially with respect to their ability to stand up to natural hazards like earthquakes, floods and storms.

The transport of fuel from and particularly the transport of the spent fuel back to Russia also involves significant risks to human health and the environment.

Whilst the IAEA has drafted standards for the safe transport of nuclear material, the reality is that these standards simply do not reflect accident conditions. Spent fuel casks for example are required to survive drops of only 9 metres and to resist temperatures of 800 C for up to 30 minutes. Studies have shown that in real accidents, for example at sea or in tunnels, fires often burn at temperatures exceeding 800 C and for considerably longer than 30 minutes. Any air transport crash will undoubtedly involve a drop of more than 9 metres. Waste storage will continue to present high levels of risk as the plant will be the largest single source of radioactive wastes in Iran. It is claimed that the waste produced can be stored and/or discharged to the environment within authorised limits.

The chemical/toxic risk from dispersal of uranium into the atmosphere is significant. As in the case of an incident at Isfahan, an explosion resulting in the dispersal of the uranium stored on the site would also be highly toxic to populations around the facility causing damage to internal organs, particularly the kidneys as well as increasing the risk of cancer. Bushehr is the single greatest source of radioactive releases in the region, with the potential for a release associated with a severe accident comparable to or even higher than the releases from the Chernobyl accident and it will affect whole area around Persian Gulf countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

Hazard 4)

Natanz-uranium enrichment plant

Natanz is located between Isfahan and Kashan in Central Iran. The facility is reportedly 100 miles north of Isfahan, and is located in old Kashan-Natanz, near a village called Deh-Zireh, itself some 25 miles southest of Kashan. IAEA inspections have documented two enrichment plants at Natanz a pilot-scale facility planned to have 1000 centrifuges and a commercial-scale plant under construction. The pilot plant, started up in June 2003, shut down in December 2003 when Iran voluntarily suspended enrichment activities. Since February 2006 when Iran resumed enrichment related activity, Iran has tested small cascades under IAEA safeguards. Construction on the commercial scale plant was also suspended in 2003, but in April 2006, Iran announced plans to install 3000 centrifuges.

The dominat hazard comes from the uranium hexaflouride gas and enriched and depleted uranium used and produced at the facility.

The importance of the pilot plant, and subsequently the commercial plant to Iran's long term plans for self sufficiency in enriched uranium, put this facility high on the list of those at risk of military attack. Iran has officially expressed its concern to the IAEA about the threat of armed attack on its nuclear programme.

As with the Nuclear Technology Research Centre at Isfahan the main consequence would be the dispersal of the UF6 enriched and depleted uranium on the sit. Dispersal of uranium would be highly toxic to populations around the facility causing damage to internal organs, particularly the kidneys, increasing the risk of cancer and genetic defects in the affected population.

Hazard 5)

Arak heavy water production plant and heavy water reactor

These facilities are located at Khondab, a village of some 6000 people in Central Iran, approximately 52km from Arak. Arak is one of Iran's main industrial cities, with a population of just over 500000.

The heavy water production plant was commissioned in mid 2006. The plant has an initial production capacity of around 8 to 10t/years, expanding to about 15t/y.

Plutonium Production

Iranian officials have stated that Iran after trying unsuccessfully to acquire from abroad a research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D to replace the old research reactor in Tehran. Iranian officials concluded , that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor, which could use the UO2 produced in Isfahan. To meet the isotope production requirements, such a reactor would require power on the order of 30-40 Mw when using natural UO2 fuel.

However, all nuclear reactors can have a dual use, and this type of reactor in particular is of a type of often associated with production of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs. As such this facility certainly increases Iran's technological options for the production of nuclear weapons should it chose to do so, with the reactor having the capacity to yield 9 to 12.5kg of plutonium each year, enough for 2-3 nuclear bombs per annum.